The social mind: Disentangling affective and cognitive routes to understanding others by Kanske, P.
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
http://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=yisr20
Interdisciplinary Science Reviews
ISSN: 0308-0188 (Print) 1743-2790 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/yisr20
The social mind: disentangling affective and
cognitive routes to understanding others
Philipp Kanske
To cite this article: Philipp Kanske (2018) The social mind: disentangling affective and
cognitive routes to understanding others, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 43:2, 115-124, DOI:
10.1080/03080188.2018.1453243
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/03080188.2018.1453243
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa
UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis
Group
Published online: 26 Apr 2018.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 491
View Crossmark data
The social mind: disentangling affective and cognitive routes
to understanding others
Philipp Kanskea,b
aFaculty of Psychology, Institute of Clinical Psychology and Psychotherapy, Technische Universität Dresden,
Dresden, Germany; bDepartment of Social Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain
Sciences, Leipzig, Germany
ABSTRACT
To flexibly adjust behaviour to that of other people around us
requires some representation of their overt actions, but also of the
driving forces behind them, that is, their goals, intentions, and
emotions. Socio-affective and -cognitive functions enable such
representations via creating vicarious affective states in the
observer (empathy) or by accumulating abstract, propositional
knowledge of another person’s mental state (Theory of Mind).
While the empathic sharing of another’s emotions is implemented
by those neural networks that also process first-hand emotion,
Theory of Mind activates a widespread network that seems to
process information independent of its specific modality or
content. Crucially, these two routes can function independently as
individual differences in the respective capacities and network
activations are unrelated and selective impairments in one or the
other function occur in psychopathology. However, they may co-
activate and co-operate in complex social situations, determining
how prosocially interactive behaviour unfolds.
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Introduction
Humans encounter and interact with others, their conspecifics, on a continual basis in a
multitude of social relations. Being able to flexibly adjust one’s own behaviour to that of
others requires some representation of the other’s actions and, ideally, the motivation
behind them, that is, the other’s emotions and thoughts (Adolphs 2003; Keysers and
Gazzola 2009). Social psychological and neuroscience research over the last few years
has identified at least two routes to such representation: an affective route that allows
us to feel with others (that is, empathy; de Vignemont and Singer 2006) and a cognitive
route that enables understanding of others’ mental states (that is, Theory of Mind
[ToM] or mentalizing; Frith and Frith 2005). The present review describes these two
routes, including their location within the larger domain of social psychological processes,
outlines the neural mechanisms underlying them, and characterizes their interplay during
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interaction with others. Crucial evidence regarding these questions also comes from altera-
tions of socio-affective and -cognitive functioning in psychopathology and from the
relations to actual (pro-)social behaviour.
The social mind
Humans are certainly not the only social species, but the complexity and flexibility of our
social interactions are unrivalled. In comparison to chimpanzees, our closest living biologi-
cal relatives, even children are more ready to co-operate with and rely on their conspecifics
(e.g. see van Leeuwen, Call, and Haun 2014). The affective and cognitive processes that
enable complexity in human social interactions are manifold. Many of them are shared
with other species but may vary in the sophistication of their development, such as affilia-
tion, emotion contagion, or some forms of perspective taking or ToM (de Waal 2011;
Bugnyar, Reber, and Buckner 2016). Others have been speculated to be uniquely human,
such as aspects of language and the processing of hierarchical structures (Fitch 2017).
Theoretical accounts vary widely on which processes are deemed crucial for social inter-
action (Happe, Cook, and Bird 2017). These may range from basic processes like action
understanding (Mier et al. 2010), social attention, and memory, to higher-order functions
such as social inference and attitudes (Fiske andTaylor 2013). To give an example based on a
developmental perspective, the following compilation of processes has been suggested:
affiliation, agent identification, emotion processing, empathy, individuals’ information
store, mental state attribution, self-processing, social hierarchy mapping, social policing,
and in-group/out-group categorization (Happe and Frith 2014). How these processes are
related to one another seems even less clear (Happe, Cook, and Bird 2017). Across accounts,
there is consensus, however, that empathy and ToM are essential elements of higher-level
social processing, as they enable access to another person’s inner states.
Socio-affective route
Being with others is one of the major triggers of emotions. These social emotions depend
on the situation and on others’ emotions, but to a large extent they depend on the person
him/herself. Witnessing another’s misfortune may provoke a shared sadness in one obser-
ver and a feeling of schadenfreude in another, a compassionate response, linked with the
desire to help, in one or indifference, and no emotion altogether in another. While scha-
denfreude and compassion are social emotions, they are in a sense complementary to
those of the person eliciting them. Other examples are envy, jealousy, guilt and shame,
embarrassment, and possibly pride (Feldman Barrett, Lewis, and Haviland-Jones 2016).
Critically, the emotional state of the interaction partners differs; your anger goes along
with my guilt. Empathy, in contrast, denotes the sharing of another’s affect, thus
leading to isomorphic emotional states in the experiencer and the observer (de Vignemont
and Singer 2006). I can share both your grief and your joy. It is therefore not surprising
that neuroimaging studies have not revealed a specific network related to empathy.
Rather, different networks are involved in sharing different emotions. While another’s
pain activates the anterior part of the insular and cingulate cortices (Singer et al. 2004;
Carr et al. 2003), sharing others’ joy activates regions in the ventral striatum (Mobbs
et al. 2009). The fact that these networks coincide with those that are active during the
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first-hand experience of the respective emotions has been interpreted as shared networks
supporting the sharing of emotions (de Vignemont and Singer 2006).
By creating a state in the observer that resembles that of another person, empathy
enables access to the other’s inner conditions. Interestingly, such sharing of others’
emotions seems to be spontaneous and happens without the explicit instruction to do
so (in healthy individuals, cf. Meffert et al. 2013). However, to date, it is unclear
whether and, if so, how exactly this information is read out by more controlled, cognitive
understanding of mental states, that is, mentalizing or ToM.
Socio-cognitive route
To understand what another person thinks or feels requires more abstract, propositional rep-
resentations of that state than mere sharing of another’s condition would allow. During
human ontogeny, we develop the capacity for such a ‘Theory of Mind’, the ability to infer
and reason about others’ perceptions, beliefs, thoughts, and emotions (Frith and Frith
2005; see also Perner, Priewasser, and Roessler 2018). While elements of ToM develop
already earlier in life (Kovács, Téglás, and Endress 2010), the critical test whether another
person’s beliefs about the world can be represented and named if they deviate from their
own beliefs is not passed before the age of four or five years (Wimmer and Perner 1983).
The neural network related to ToM largely differs from those brain regions involved
in empathy. Across different ToM operationalizations, the temporoparietal junction is
consistently activated together with the medial prefrontal cortex (Schurz et al. 2014).
However, a larger network including the posterior cingulate cortex/precuneus, superior
temporal gyrus, and the temporal poles is active for mental state understanding in
more realistically complex scenarios (Wolf, Dziobek, and Heekeren 2010). Interestingly,
each of the different ToM operationalizations activates a different portion of this larger
network (see Schneider et al. 2014; Saxe and Kanwisher 2003; Mitchell, Heatherton,
and Macrae 2002), suggesting that they differentially tap into the processes constituting
full-blown ToM (Schurz and Perner 2015).
As emotion sharing is enabled by the neural networks involved in the first-hand
emotion experience, the ToM network is also activated for a multitude of other processes.
Most prominently, the same regions have reliably been observed during passive control
conditions in externally oriented tasks, which led to their denomination as default
mode network (Raichle et al. 2001) and further specification as crucial for self-generated
thought or mind-wandering (Andrews-Hanna, Smallwood, and Spreng 2014). Parts of it,
in particular, in the medial prefrontal cortex, have also been associated with metacogni-
tion, the ability to think about and monitor one’s own cognitive processes (Baird et al.
2013). What self-generated thought, metacognition, and ToM seem to share is a focus
on internal processes, be they related to own mental states or to those of others.
Disentangling socio-affective and -cognitive functions
Independent capacities
The socio-affective and -cognitive functions described above are conceptually separable
and have been investigated mainly in distinct lines of research. But how do they relate
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to each other? Are strong empathizers also proficient mentalizers? And do the different
networks co-activate in complex social settings that require both functions? A recently
developed experimental paradigm simulates such complex situations of social understand-
ing and involves participants viewing short autobiographical narrations that vary in emo-
tionality and ToM demands (Figure 1; Kanske, Böckler, et al. 2015). Participants judge the
valence of their emotions, probing the empathic sharing of others’ affect, and indicate how
much compassion they feel for the narrator. Questions about the narrator’s thoughts
probe participants’ ToM capacities. A final rating asks about the confidence in having
responded correctly to the previous ToM question, giving an indication of metacognitive
accuracy. This study shows that distinct neural networks associated with each of these
functions can be isolated within-subject, within-task (for a schematic depiction, see
Figure 2; Kanske, Böckler, et al. 2015; Molenberghs et al. 2016). The propensity to
empathise with or mentalize on the narrator is also associated with structural brain differ-
ences in cortical thickness in these networks (Valk et al. 2016, 2017). Crucially, the task
allows probing whether empathizing and mentalizing are directly related, and thus,
Figure 1. Depiction of events in a trial of the EmpaToM task with an example story and question in the
lower row (emotional, ToM condition). Adapted from Kanske, Böckler, et al. (2015).
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whether there is a general social capacity. The answer is clearly no; there is no association
on a behavioural or neural level, showing that strong empathizers are not necessarily good
mentalizers (Kanske et al. 2016).
If empathy and ToM can function independently, then it should be possible to see selec-
tive impairments or changes in either one of them. Indeed, impairments in ToM have been
consistently described for patients with autism spectrum disorder (Frith 2001) or in ageing
(Reiter et al. 2017), while empathy seems to be preserved, when controlling for alexithymic
deficits (Bird et al. 2010). Psychopathic individuals and aggressive criminal offenders, in
contrast, show empathy deficits (Meffert et al. 2013) without concurrent changes in
ToM (Winter et al. 2017).
Interactions of empathy and tom
Complex real-life social situations will require the joint, simultaneous, and possibly inter-
active activation of the different neural networks associated with empathy and ToM. Indir-
ect evidence for such joint activity comes from ameta-analysis on empathy for others’ pain
(Lamm, Decety, and Singer 2011). Here, the empathy-related network is activated both
when we directly see somebody else in pain and when we have to deduce this from an
abstract cue symbol. However, in contrast to direct pain presentation, the abstract cues
additionally activate the ToM-related network, putatively because the other’s state
needs to be inferred from the cues. The affective representation of the other’s pain in
the anterior insula would then be secondary and follow that of the ToM-related network.
Co-activation of the two networks is also observed in primary studies that involve par-
ticipants in complex social tasks. For instance, when observing social exclusion, empathiz-
ing may again follow the cognitive understanding of the consequences of the situation for
the other, resulting in activation of both networks (Masten, Morelli, and Eisenberger
2011). Empathic accuracy studies, in which emotional narrations of others are to be con-
tinuously judged regarding the emotional state of the narrator, also jointly activate the
Figure 2. Schematic of the neural networks supporting empathy, compassion, ToM, and metacogni-
tion. Anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), anterior insula (AI), Brodmann area 10 (BA10), dorsal/ventral tem-
poroparietal junction (d/vTPJ), medial frontal cortex (MFC), precuneus/posterior cingulate cortex (PRE),
striatum (STR), superior temporal sulcus (STS), and temporal poles (TP). Adapted from Kanske, Böckler,
and Singer (2017).
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empathy- and ToM-related networks (Zaki et al. 2009). However, due to the direct acces-
sibility of the other’s emotion, empathic sharing may in this case precede and inform the
higher-level cognitive judgment of the other’s affective state.
Empathy for others’ suffering constitutes a particular case, because it entails an emotion-
ally negative, aversive state in the observer andmay, therefore, cause the same consequences
as the first-hand negative emotion, such as impaired cognitive functioning (Wessa et al.
2013). Using the experimental paradigm described above (Figure 1) allows direct testing
of the consequences of sharing negative affect on ToM. On a neural level, mentalizing-
related activity in the temporoparietal junction is indeed inhibited by empathy-related acti-
vation in the anterior insula, when the video content is emotionally negative (Kanske et al.
2016).On a behavioural level, this inhibition comeswith impairments inToMperformance.
This pattern of network interaction resembles that of the task-control or salience network
and the default mode network in situations of high external task demands (Menon and
Uddin 2010; Trautwein, Singer, and Kanske 2016; Bonhage et al. 2016). The adaptive func-
tionmay be to prioritize the processing of those aspects of a situation that require immediate
reaction, such as others’ emotion. The pattern is, however, also reminiscent of increased
emotional distraction in psychopathology (Kanske et al. 2013; Kanske, Schonfelder, et al.
2015) and the hypothesis of stress-impaired mentalization, particularly in borderline per-
sonality disorder (Fonagy and Luyten 2009; Mier et al. 2013). Impaired emotion regulation
and the resulting ‘empathic distress’ (Singer and Klimecki 2014) may, therefore, lead to a
chronified ToM inhibition in psychopathology.
Consequences for social behaviour
Understanding what the emotional consequences of our actions for another person are
and sharing these emotions may enable more flexible and prosocial behaviour. Several
studies have verified the role of empathy and ToM for prosociality (Masten, Morelli,
and Eisenberger 2011; Klimecki et al. 2016; Hare et al. 2010). Specifically, costly helping
of others in need is predicted by both activation in the anterior insula and the temporo-
parietal junction (Tusche et al. 2016). The weight that empathy for or cognitive under-
standing of the other in need had in the social decision to help was selectively reflected
by these regions’ activation patterns, respectively. The same held true when empathy
and ToM were assessed independently of the specific helping situation, suggesting that
stable, individual propensities to engage one or the other of these processes determine
social behaviour.
Considering the complex context in which social interactions take place in real life, a
number of other important factors play a role. A direct, static relation of, for instance,
empathy to prosocial behaviour seems to be an oversimplification. A particularly impor-
tant factor is group membership. The spontaneous empathic response is reduced for
members of another group, which goes along with decreased helping (Hein et al. 2010).
Moreover, the suffering of out-group members may even elicit pleasurable emotions
such as schadenfreude (Cikara et al. 2014). Because of the putative relation to increased
in-group empathy, these negative outcomes have been discussed as ‘dark sides of
empathy’ (Breithaupt 2017, 2018).
However, there are studies showing that empathy cannot only be trained but even
improved in inter-group settings. Pharmacologically, the administration of oxytocin, a
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peptide hormone, increased sensitivity to the pain of Palestinians in Jewish Israeli partici-
pants (Shamay-Tsoory et al. 2013). Also, the repeated experience of being helped by an
out-group member increases empathy for members of other groups (Hein et al. 2016).
Another approach has been to train individuals’ capacities to cultivate positive emotions
of compassion and concern for others in need, which also increases prosocial behaviour
(Leiberg, Klimecki, and Singer 2011; Klimecki et al. 2014).
As research proceeds in answering how we represent not only the overt, behavioural but
also the covert, mental states of others, it becomes evident that the challenges lying ahead
are to (1) study the different underlying mechanisms in concert, ideally in truly interactive
settings, (2) investigate their developmental origins to illuminate the causes of impair-
ments, and (3) probe their malleability via training.
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